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Abstract: Wee (PKC’12) proposed a generic public-key encryption
scheme in the setting of related-key attacks. Bellare, Paterson and Thom-
son (Asiacrypt’12) provided a framework enabling related-key attack
(RKA) secure cryptographic primitives for a class of non-linear related-
key derivation functions. However, in both of their constructions, the
instantiations to achieve the full (not weak) RKA security are given un-
der the scenario regarding the private key composed of single element.
In other words, each element of the private key shares the same mod-
ification. However, this is impractical in real world. In this paper, we
concentrate on the security of public-key encryption schemes under lin-
ear related-key attacks in the setting of multi-element private keys (that
is, the private key is composed of more than one element), where an
adversary is allowed to tamper any part of this private key stored in
a hardware device, and subsequently observe the outcome of a public-
key encryption system under this targeted modified private key. We de-
fine the security model for RKA secure public-key encryption schemes
as chosen-ciphertext and related-key attack (CC-RKA) security, which
means that a public-key encryption scheme remains secure even when an
adversary is allowed to issue the decryption oracle on linear shifts of any
component of the private key. After that, we present a detailed public-
key encryption schemes with the private key formed of several elements,
of which the CC-RKA security is under the decisional BDH assumption
in the standard model.
Keywords: Public-key encryption, Linear related-key attack, CC-RKA
security.
1 Introduction
The security of cryptographic algorithms are analyzed in the black-box model,
where an adversary may view the algorithm’s inputs and outputs, but the private
key as well as all the internal computations remain perfectly hidden. Unfortu-
nately, this assumption does not reflect the real world, where a private key could
be frequently compromised for various reasons. In this case, the adversary might
get some partial information about private keys through some methods, which
are not anticipated by the designer of the system and, correspondingly, not taken
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into account when arguing its security. Such attacks, referred to as key-leakage
attacks, come in a large variety. An important example is side-channel [25] at-
tacks that exploit information leakage from the implementation of an algorithm,
where an adversary observes some “physical output” of a computation (such as
radiation, power, temperature, and running time), in addition to the “logical
output” of the computation.
In modern cryptography, this requirement has been relaxed to capture se-
curity under the scenarios where some information of the keys is leaked to the
adversary. When an adversary tampers the private key stored in a cryptographic
hardware device and observes the result of the cryptographic primitive under
this modified private key, there is a related-key attack (RKA) [4, 15]. The key
here could be a signing key of a certificate authority or a decryption key of an
encryption system. In related-key attacks, the adversary attempts to break an
encryption scheme (or a signature scheme) by invoking it with several private
keys (or signing keys) satisfying some known relations. So far, the RKA security
has been done on a variety of cryptographic primitives such as identity-based
encryption, public-key encryption, symmetric encryption, signature [4, 6]. Ap-
plebaum, Harnik and Ishai [2] put forward symmetric encryption schemes secure
against linear related-key attacks. Wee [27] presented the public-key encryption
schemes resilient against linear related-key attacks under standard assumptions
in the standard model. Bellare, Paterson and Thomson [6] provided a frame-
work enabling the RKA secure cryptographic primitives for sets of related-key
derivation functions that are non-linear. [13] achieved the RKA security from the
Cramer-Shoup public-key encryption scheme which fails to achieve it. We note
that in [4], the strong, adaptive versions of the definitions on related-key attacks
were introduced, but all the above works of the instantiations for the full RKA
security (this excludes the weak RKA security referred in [27]) are considered
under a scenario where the private key shares the same modification on every
component (this includes the case of single-element private key).
Motivated by the above, we ask besides the generic method proposed in [6],
whether cryptographic primitives fully resilient against related-key attacks can
be built beyond the single-element key setting, meaning that the private key is
composed of several components as sk = (sk1, . . ., skn) for n ∈ Z+, and the
modification to different elements of the private key could be different.
Our contributions. In this paper, we focus on the full chosen-ciphertext at-
tack (CCA) security of public-key encryption schemes with the private keys of
multiple components under related-key attacks from a different point of view,
avoiding the usage of the generic methodology to achieve the RKA secure cryp-
tographic primitives proposed in [6] and the fingerprinting property to achieve
the RKA secure public-key encryption suggested in [27].
To begin with, we briefly describe the framework introduced in [4]. Infor-
mally, a public-key encryption scheme is secure under related-key attacks if it is
secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks even when the adversary obtains partial
information of the message in the public-key encryption scheme under the mod-
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ified private keys of the adversary. This is modeled by providing the adversary
with access to a related-key attack decryption oracle: the adversary can query
the oracle with any function (φ, C), where φ is the relate-key deriving function
and C is ciphertext, and then receive the decryption of C under φ(sk), where
sk is the private key. Note that the related-key deriving functions can be chosen
depending on the public key, which is known to the adversary. The adversary
can query the related-key attack oracle adaptively, with only one restriction that
the decryption of a ciphertext C with the private key φ(sk) cannot equal the
decryption of the challenge ciphertext C∗ with the original private key sk.
In [27], the constructions exploit some existing public-key encryption schemes
that are susceptible to linear related-key attacks to obtain public-key encryption
schemes that are secure against linear related-key attacks from adaptive trapdoor
relations via strong one-time signatures, which generate a tag in the ciphertext
of the concrete scheme. The security of this realization is analogous to those for
obtaining chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA) security from extractable hash proofs
[26], and trapdoor functions [21]. Following the technical methods in [27], we
work with a tag-based notion of CCA security [20], where the tag is derived using
a strong one-time signature scheme and a signature is added to the ciphertext. In
this case, if the ciphertext C queried by the adversary shared the same tag as the
challenge ciphertext C∗, then because of the security of one-time signature, C
should equal C∗. On the other hand, if C has a different tag from C∗, then C can
be decrypted using the deriving private key φ(sk), where φ denoted a linear shift.
However, to achieve the full chosen-ciphertext and related-key attack (CC-RKA)
security, we need to address another problem where C = C∗ but φ(sk) 6= sk.
Here, in our public-key encryption schemes, we guarantee that the adversary
procures nothing about the plaintext M∗ of C∗ from the decryption of C∗ under
any φ(sk) 6= sk because of the additive randomness hidden in the response rather
than the Φ-fingerprinting suggested by [27].
At this point, it is sufficient for us to present a specific construction of CC-
RKA secure public-key encryption systems under the setting of multi-component
private keys. Our scheme is from bilinear pairings based on the identity-based
encryption scheme in [9], of which the CC-RKA security can be proved under
the decisional BDH assumption.
1.1 Related Work
In 2004, Micali and Reyzin [24] put forward a comprehensive framework for
modeling security against side-channel attacks, which relies on the assumption
that there is no leakage of information in the absence of computation. Later,
Halderman et al. [19] described a set of attacks violating the assumption of the
framework of Micali and Reyzin [24]. Specially speaking, their “cold boot” at-
tacks showed that a significant fraction of the bits of a cryptographic key can
be recovered if the key is ever stored in memory, of which the framework was
modeled by Akavia, Goldwasser and Vaikuntanathan [1]. Similarly, fault injec-
tion techniques can be used to falsify, inducing the internal state of the devices
being modified, if given physical access to the hardware devices [8]. Bellare and
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Kohno [5] investigated related-key attacks from a theoretical point of view and
presented an approach to formally handle the notion of related-key attacks. Fol-
lowing the approach in [5], Lucks [22] presented some constructions for block
ciphers and pseudorandom function generators. To solve the open problem in
related-secret security whether or not related-key secure blockciphers exist, Bel-
lare and Cash [3] provided the first constructions to create related-secret pseu-
dorandom bits. Based on the work in [3], Applebaum, Harnik, and Ishai [2] gave
RKA secure symmetric encryption schemes, which can be used in garbled circuits
in secure computation. Later, Bellare, Cash and Miller [4] proposed approaches
to build high-level primitives secure against related-key attacks like signatures,
CCA secure public-key encryption, identity-based encryption, based on RKA
secure pseudorandom functions. Other work about cryptographic systems with
RKA security includes signatures [6, 17], CCA secure public-key encryption [6,
27], identity-based encryption [6].
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly
review the properties of bilinear maps and the complexity assumptions, and the
concepts associated to this work. In Section 3, we elaborate the security model of
RKA secure public-key encryption schemes. In Section 4, we point out a simple
related-key attack on an existing scheme. In Section 5, we present a public-key
encryption scheme with RKA security, and analyze its CC-RKA security based
on the decisional BDH assumption. In Section 6, we talk about RKA security
in a further step under the random oracle model, where the related-key deriving
function could be non-linear such as affine, polynomial. Finally, we conclude this
paper in Section 7.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we review some basic notions, definitions, and tools that are
used in our constructions. We formally state the complexity assumptions, and
the technical definitions that will be used repeatedly in our analysis.
2.1 Complexity Assumptions
Suppose that Groupgen is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that takes
input a security parameter 1λ and outputs a triplet (G, GT , p, g, eˆ) where G,
GT are two groups of order p, g is generator of G, p is a λ-bit prime number,
and eˆ : G×G→ GT is a bilinear map with the following properties [12]:
– Bilinear: for all g ∈ G and a, b ∈ Z∗p , we have eˆ(ga, gb) = eˆ(g, g)ab.
– Non-degenerate: eˆ(g, g) 6= 1.
The decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) assumption. The de-
cisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption is that the ensembles {G, g, gx1 ,
gx2 , gx3 , eˆ(g, g)x1x2x3} and {G, g, gx1 , gx2 , gx3 , Z} are computationally indis-
tinguishable, where (G, GT , p, g, eˆ) ← Groupgen(1λ), and the elements g ∈ G,
Z ∈ GT , x1, x2, x3 ∈ Z∗p are chosen independently and uniformly at random.
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2.2 Public-Key Encryption
A public-key encryption scheme is composed of the following three randomized
algorithms [16]: Keygen, Encrypt, and Decrypt.
– Keygen(1λ) → (sk, pk): Taking a security parameter λ as input, this algo-
rithm outputs a private key and a public key pair (sk, pk).
– Encryptpk(m) → C: Taking a plaintext m (in some implicit message space),
and a public key pk as input, this algorithm outputs a ciphertext C.
– Decryptsk(C) → m: Taking a ciphertext C, and a private key sk as input,
this algorithm outputs m for a valid ciphertext or ⊥ for an invalid ciphertext.
We require that a public-key encryption system is correct, meaning that if
(sk, pk) ← Keygen(1λ), and C ← Encryptpk(m), then Decryptsk(C) = m.
2.3 One-Time Signature
A signature scheme is composed of three randomized algorithms (Gen, Sign,
Verify) [7] as follows.
– (SK, V K) ← Gen(1λ): Taking a security parameter λ as input, this algo-
rithm outputs a signing key and a verification key pair (SK, V K).
– σ← SignSK(m): Taking a signing key SK and a message m (in some implicit
message space) as input, this algorithm outputs a signatures σ.
– VerifyV K(m, σ) = 1/0: Taking a verification key V K and a signature σ as
input, this algorithm outputs 1 for “acceptance” or 0 for “rejection”.
We require that for all (SK, V K) output by Gen, all m in the message space,
and all σ output by SignSK(m), we have VerifyV K(m, σ) = 1.
A signature scheme is a strong one-time signature (OTS) scheme [11] if for
any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A such that the quantity
Pr
VerifyV K(m′, σ′) = 1(m′, σ′) 6= (m,σ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣





is negligible in λ.
A Strong One-Time Signature Scheme from DDH. We present the one-time sig-
nature scheme in [18, 27], which is secure under the difficulty of computing dis-
crete log and H is collision resistant function.
– Key generation. Choose a random g ∈ G, random a, b, c ∈ Z∗p , and set
u1 = g
a, u2 = g
b, u3 = g
c. Also, choose a collision resistant hash function
H : G→ Z∗p . The verification key is V K = (u1, u2, u3), and the signing key
is SK = (a, b, c).
– Sign. To sign a message M ∈ G,
1. choose a random e ∈ Z∗p , and compute w = c+ e · a+ (H(M) + e) · b.
2. output signature σ = (e, w).
– Verify. To verify signature σ = (e, w), check gw = u3u1
eu2
H(M)+e. If the
equation holds, output 1; otherwise, output 0.
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3 Modeling Related-Key Attacks
In this section, we define the notion of security under chosen-ciphertext attacks;
in addition, we present an extension of this notion to the setting of related-key
attacks, as introduced by Bellare, Cash and Miller [4].
3.1 Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks
A public-key encryption scheme (Keygen, Encrypt, Decrypt) is secure against
chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA security) if for a stateful adversary algorithm





(m0,m1)← ADecryptsk(·)(pk), |m0| = |m1|.




is negligible in the security parameter λ, where Decryptsk(·) is an oracle that on
an input C, it returns Decryptsk(C).
The weaker security notion of security against chosen-plaintext attacks (CPA
security) is obtained in the above security game when depriving adversary A of
the the access to the decryption oracle.
3.2 RKA Security
Related-key deriving functions. Our definition follows the notion of related-
key deriving functions given in [5]. Briefly speaking, a class Φ of related-key
deriving functions φ: sk → sk is a finite set of functions with the same domain
and range, which map a key to a related key. Additionally, Φ should allow an
efficient membership test, and φ should be efficiently computable. Note that in
our concrete constructions, we only consider the class Φ+ as linear shifts.
The family Φ+. Any function φ : Z∗p → Z∗p in this class is indexed by 4 ∈ Z∗p ,
where φ4(sk) = sk+4. Note that if sk is composed of several elements as (sk1,
. . ., skn) with n ∈ Z+, for any ski where i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, 4i ∈ Z∗p .
CC-RKA Security. A public-key encryption scheme (Keygen, Encrypt, De-






(m0,m1)← ARKA.Decryptsk(·,·)(pk), |m0| = |m1|.




is negligible in the security parameter λ, where RKA.Decryptsk(·, ·) is an oracle
that on an input (φ, C), it returns Decryptφ(sk)(C). We constraint algorithm A
to only make queries (φ, C) such that φ ∈ Φ and (φ(sk), C) 6= (sk, C∗).
PKE Resilient Against Linear RKAs Revisited 7
4 RKA Attacks on An Existing Scheme
The algorithms of the CCA secure public-key encryption scheme in [11] are given
as follows, which is claimed to be CCA secure under the related-key attacks where
each component of the private key shares the same linear related-key deriving
function in [4]. Let (Mac, Vrfy) denote the message authentication code [11]. Let
H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ represent a hash function to be second-preimage resistant
[11]. Let G be a group of order p, and let eˆ : G×G → GT be a bilinear group.
– Key generation. To generate the public key and secret key of the system,
1. choose random g ∈ G, x1, x2, y ∈ Z∗p , and set g1 = gx1 , g2 = gx2 , g3 =
gy, Ω = eˆ(g1, g3).
2. choose a hash function h from a family of pairwise-independent hash
functions [11].
The public key is PK = (g, h, g1, g2, g3, Ω), and the secret key is SK =
(x1, x2, y).
– Encryption. To encrypt a message M ∈ GT ,
1. choose a random r ∈ {0, 1}∗, and set k1 = h(r), ID = H(r).
2. choose a random s ∈ Z∗p , and set C = (gs, g2sg3s·ID, Ωs ⊕ (M ◦ r)).
3. output ciphertext (ID, C, Mack1(C)).
– Decryption. To decrypt a ciphertext (ID, C, Mack1(C)),
1. parse C as (C1, C2, C3), choose a random t ∈ Z∗p , and computes (M ◦ r)
= C3 ⊕ eˆ(C1x1·y+t·(x2+y·ID)C2−t, g).
2. set k1 = h(r). If Vrfyk1(C, tag) = 1 and H(r) = ID, output M ; otherwise,
output ⊥.
The attack. We point out a related-key attack on the above scheme where
each element of the private key has its own linear related-key deriving function.
Note that this does not contradict to the result in [11], since we consider a dif-
ferent related-key deriving function from theirs. Suppose we are given a valid
ciphertext (ID, C, Mack1(C)) of some message M . We can recover M by mak-
ing decryption queries to RKA.Decrypt oracle on a related secret key via the
following attack. For any 4i ∈ Z∗p , i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, we change the secret key (x1,
x2, y) to (x1, x2 +42, y+43) where 42 = −ID ·43, then (ID, C, Mack1(C))
can be decrypted to M directly.
5 An Instantiation from Bilinear Pairings
In this section, we propose a public-key encryption scheme in the setting of
related-key attacks from bilinear pairings, and reduce its CC-RKA security based
on the decisional BDH assumption.
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5.1 The Construction
Let G be a group of order p, and let eˆ : G × G → GT be a bilinear group.
Based on the selective-identity secure identity-based encryption scheme in [9],
we construct a CC-RKA secure public-key encrypiton scheme as follows.
– Key generation. To generate the public key and secret key of the system,
1. choose random g, h ∈ G, x1, x2, y ∈ Z∗p , and set g1 = gx1 , g2 = gx2 , h1
= hy1 , h2 = h
y2 , Ω = eˆ(g, g)x1·x2 .
2. choose two collision resistant hash functions H1 : G
3 → Z∗p , H2 : G3×GT
→ Z∗p .
The public key is PK = (g, h, g1, g2, h1, h2, Ω, H1, H2), and the secret key
is SK = (x1, x2, y1, y2).
– Encryption. To encrypt a message M ∈ GT ,
1. choose random a, b, c ∈ Z∗p independently, and set u1 = ga, u2 = gb,
u3 = g
c.
2. choose a random r ∈ Z∗p , compute t = H1(u1, u2, u3), and set C = (C1,
C2, C3, C4, C5), where
C1 = g
r, C2 = h
r, C3 = h1
rg2
r·t, C4 = h2rg1r·t, C5 = Ωr ·M.
3. choose a random e ∈ Z∗p , and compute σ = c+ e · a+ (H2(C) + e) · b.
4. output ciphertext (u, e, σ, C), where u = (u1, u2, u3).
– Decryption. To decrypt a ciphertext (u, e, σ, C),
1. parse u as (u1, u2, u3), and compute t = H1(u1, u2, u3).
2. parse C as (C1, C2, C3, C4, C5), and output ⊥ if gσ 6= u3u1eu2H2(C)+e.
3. if eˆ(C3, g) = eˆ(C1, h1) · eˆ(C1, g2)t, eˆ(C3, h) = eˆ(C2, h1) · eˆ(C2, g2)t, and
eˆ(C4, g) = eˆ(C1, h2) · eˆ(C1, g1)t, eˆ(C4, h) = eˆ(C2, h2) · eˆ(C2, g1)t, choose






Note that the pairing computation of eˆ(C3, g) = eˆ(C1, h1) · eˆ(C1, g2)t,
eˆ(C3, h) = eˆ(C2, h1) · eˆ(C2, g2)t, and eˆ(C4, g) = eˆ(C1, h2) · eˆ(C1, g1)t,
eˆ(C4, h) = eˆ(C2, h2) · eˆ(C2, g1)t to check the correctness of the ciphertext
can be done by a third party [23], and we do not count them in the
computation cost.













and therefore the decryption algorithm is always correct.
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5.2 Security
Theorem 1. The above public-key encryption scheme is secure in the CC-RKA
security game regarding linear related-key deriving function φ+ under the deci-
sional BDH assumption.
Proof. The intuition of the proof is as follows. We show that given an algorithm
A that breaks the security of the CC-RKA secure public-key encryption scheme,
we can build an algorithm B that solves the decisional BDH problem, which is
given a random tuple (g, gx1 , gx2 , gx3 , Z) as input. Algorithm B’s goal is to
determine whether Z = eˆ(gx1 , gx2)x3 or Z is a random element in GT .
Setup. Algorithm B chooses a random γ ∈ Z∗p such that h = gγ , two hash
functions H1 : G
3 → Z∗p , H2 : G4 → Z∗p , and sets g1 = gx1 , g2 = gx2 , and










a, u∗2 = g
b, u∗3 = g
c. Then algorithm B chooses
random y1, y2 ∈ Z∗p , and sets h1 = g2−t
∗
hy1 , h2 = g1
−t∗hy2 . Algorithm B sends
the public key PK = (g, h, g1, g2, h1, h2, Ω, H1, H2) to algorithm A.
Phase 1. Algorithm A queries (φ, (u, e, σ, C)) to RKA.Decrypt oracle. Algo-
rithm B proceeds as follows.
– Parses C as (C1, C2, C3, C4, C5). If eˆ(C3, g) 6= eˆ(C2, h1) · eˆ(C1, g1)t, or
eˆ(C4, g) 6= eˆ(C2, h2) · eˆ(C1, g2)t, algorithm B outputs ⊥.




H2(C)+e, algorithm B outputs ⊥.
– Computes t = H1(u1, u2, u3). If t = t
∗, algorithm B aborts the simulation.
Otherwise, algorithm B runs in the following steps.





































2. Computes M as M = C5/[eˆ(d1, C1) · eˆ(C−s
′
1






To see this, we rewrite
M =
C5
[eˆ(d1, C1) · eˆ(C−s
′
1










[eˆ(d1, C1) · eˆ(C3, g−s′1) · eˆ(d2, C1) · eˆ(C4, g−s′2)]1/2
=
C5
[eˆ(d1, C1) · eˆ(C3, (gx1) 1t−t∗ · g−s1) · eˆ(d2, C1) · eˆ(C4, (gx2) 1t−t∗ · g−s2 ] 12
.
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4x2 g24x1 g4x1 ·4x2 g(s1·t·4x2+s2·t·4x1 )+γ·(s1·4y1+s2·4y2 ))
.












4x2 g24x1 g4x1 ·4x2 g(s1·t·4x2+s2·t·4x1 )+γ·(s1·4y1+s2·4y2 ))
,
where φ(x1) = x1 + 4x1 , φ(x2) = x2 + 4x2 , φ(y1) = y1 + 4y1 , and
φ(y2) = y2 +4y2 .
Thus, as long as the ciphertext from algorithm A is correctly formu-
lated, algorithm B’s response is always identical to the RKA decryption
algorithm as required.
Note that algorithm B responds the RKA decryption queries without using the
secret key SK.
Challenge. AlgorithmA outputs two messages M0, M1 ∈ GT on which it wishes
to be challenged. Algorithm B chooses a random d ∈ {0, 1}, and responds with










x3 , C∗2 = (g
x3)γ , C∗3 = (g
x3)γ·y1 , C∗4 = (g
x3)γ·y2 , C∗5 = Z ·Md.
Hence, if Z = eˆ(g, g)x1x2x3 = eˆ(g1, g2)
x3 . then C∗ is a valid encryption of Md
with respect to t∗. On the other hand, when Z is a random in GT , then C∗ is
independent of d in algorithm A’s view.
Phase 2. Algorithm A continues to adaptively issue queries (φ, (u, e, σ, C)) to
RKA.Decrypt oracle.
– If φ(SK) = SK and C = C∗, algorithm B responds with ⊥.
– Otherwise, algorithm B responds as in Phase 1 except when H1(u1, u2, u3)




4x2 g24x1 g4x1 ·4x2 g(s1·t
∗·4x2+s2·t∗·4x1 )+γ·(s1·4y1+s2·4y2 ))
.
Note that without the randomness chosen by algorithm B, algorithm A has a
negligible probability in outputting Md. In other words, M
′ is independent of d
from the view of algorithm A.
Output. Algorithm A output a guess d′ ∈ {0, 1}. If d′ = d, algorithm B outputs
1; otherwise, algorithm B outputs 0.
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Let abort be the event that algorithm B aborts during the simulation. To
conclude the proof of Theorem 1, it remains to bound the probability that algo-
rithm B aborts the simulation for one of algorithm A’s RKA decryption queries.
We claim that Pr[abort] is negligible, or one can use algorithm A to forge sig-
natures with at least the same probability. Briefly, we can construct another
algorithm B′ to simulate the above security game that is given the private key,
but is given the signing key as a challenge in an existential forgery game. Algo-
rithm A causes an abort by querying a ciphertext including an existential forgery
under the given signing key. Algorithm B′ is able to use this forgery to win the
existential forgery game. Note that during the game algorithm A makes only
one chosen message query to generate the signature needed for the challenger
ciphertext. Thus, Pr[abort] is negligible.
From the analysis of Phase 2, definitely, algorithm A has negligible proba-
bility in outputting d′ = d via the RKA decryption queries, as M ′ is always
consistent with two random s1, s2 ∈ Z∗p chosen by algorithm B such that M ′
is independent of d from the view of algorithm A. Let  be the advantage that
algorithm A breaks the CC-RKA security of the above game. Therefore, we can
see that if algorithm B’s input tuple is (g, ga, gb, gc, Z) where Z = eˆ(g, g)abc,
then algorithm A’s view of this simulation is identical to the real attack, thus
algorithm A’s probability in outputting d′ = d must satisfy Pr[d = d′] = 1/2+ .
On the other hand, if algorithm B’s input tuple is (g, ga, gb, gc, Z) where
Z ∈ GT , then algorithm A’s advantage is nil, and algorithm A’s view of the
challenge ciphertext is independent of d, thus algorithm A’s probability in out-
putting d′ = d is Pr[d′ = d] = 1/2. To sum up, algorithm B’s probability in
solving the decisional BDH problem is
Pr[B(g, ga, gb, gc, Z)] = 1/2 · (1/2 + ) + 1/2 · 1/2 = 1/2 + /2.
This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
5.3 Comparison
We compare the example of CC-RKA secure public-key encryption scheme re-
ferred to in [4], the strongly CC-RKA secure public-key encryption scheme from
BDH in [27], the transformation from the Cramer-Shoup public-key encryption
scheme to achieve CC-RKA security in [13]. and ours from BDH in Table 1.
In this table, “Pairing-E” means the sum of paring computation executed
during the encryption phase, and “Pairing-D” means the sum of paring com-
putation executed during the decryption phase. “Ex-E” means the the sum
of exponentiation computation executed during the encryption phase, “Ex-D”
means the the sum of exponentiation computation executed during the decryp-
tion phase.
6 Discussion
We only consider the linear related-key deriving function in the above public-
key encryption scheme. Actually, the related-key deriving function could be
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Table 1. Comparison between public-key encryption schemes with CC-RKA security
Scheme Ciphertext Pairing-E Pairing-D Ex-E Ex-D Full RKA Muti-Element
Size Security Private Key
[4] 4 0 1 6 4 No Yes
[27] 6 1 3 7 5 Yes No
[13] 5 0 0 7 5 No Yes
Ours 6 0 1 10 7 Yes Yes
non-linear such as constant, affine, polynomial. To achieve the CC-RKA se-
curity beyond the linear barrier, we can simply change C4 = Ω
r · M to C4 =
H(Ωr||g1r||g2r||h1r||h2r) · M , where H : GT ×G4 → GT is a collision resistant
hash function.
Theorem 2. The above public-key encryption scheme is secure in the CC-RKA
security game beyond linear related-key deriving function φ+ under the decisional
BDH assumption in the random oracle model.
Proof. The process of this proof roughly follows that of Theorem 1 except that
we add a random oracle H to the public parameter, so the responses to the RKA
decryption queries will be different from those in Theorem 1.
At any time, algorithmA can query Y ||Y1||Y2||Y3||Y4 to the random oracle H.
Algorithm B keeps a list LH of tuples (Y ||Y1||Y2||Y3||Y4, H(Y ||Y1||Y2||Y3||Y4))
which is initially empty. For a query to the random oracle H from algorithm A,
– if Y ||Y1||Y2||Y3||Y4 already appears in list LH , algorithm B responds with
H(Z||Y1||Y2||Y3||Y4).
– if either eˆ(Y1, g) = eˆ(g1, g
x3), eˆ(Y2, g) = eˆ(g2, g
x3), or eˆ(Y3, g) = eˆ(h1, g
x3),
eˆ(Y4, g) = eˆ(h2, g
x3), algorithm B solves the decisional BDH problem imme-
diately via eˆ(Y1, g2), eˆ(Y2, g1), or
eˆ(Y3, g2) = eˆ((g1
−t∗hy2)x3 , g2) = eˆ(g1x3 , g2)−t
∗ · eˆ((gx3)γ·y2 , g2)





eˆ(Y4, g1) = eˆ((g2
−t∗hy1)x3 , g1) = eˆ(g2x3 , g1)−t
∗ · eˆ((gx3)γ·y1 , g1)





– otherwise, algorithm B chooses a random Zi ∈ GT to answer, and adds
(Y ||Y1||Y2||Y3||Y4, Zi) to list LH .
In Phase 1, when algorithm A queries (φ, (u, e, σ, C)) to RKA.Decrypt
oracle, where φ can be any kind of related-key deriving functions,
– algorithm B parses C as (C1, C2, C3, C4, C5), if either eˆ(C3, g) 6= eˆ(C2, h1)
· eˆ(C1, g1)t, or eˆ(C4, g) 6= eˆ(C2, h2) · eˆ(C1, g2)t, algorithm B outputs ⊥.
– algorithm B parses u as (u1, u2, u2), if gσ 6= u3u1eu2H2(C)+e, algorithm B
outputs ⊥.
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– algorithm B computes t = H1(u1, u2, u3), if t = t∗, algorithm B aborts the
simulation.
– if either eˆ(Y1, g) = eˆ(g1, C1), eˆ(Y2, g) = eˆ(g2, C1), or eˆ(Y3, g) = eˆ(h1, C2),
eˆ(Y4, g) = eˆ(h2, C2) algorithm B can answer with M ′ = C5/Zi directly, where
Zi is consistent to some existed Y ||Y1||Y2||Y3||Y4 in list LH .
– otherwise, algorithm B chooses a random Zi ∈ GT , compute M ′ = C5/Zi to
respond, and adds (Y ||Y1||Y2||Y3||Y4, Zi) to list LH .
In Phase 2, when algorithm A queries (φ, (u, e, σ, C)) to RKA.Decrypt
oracle with the restriction that φ(SK) 6= SK, algorithm B responds as in Phase
1 except that in the case t = t∗, it chooses a random Zi ∈ GT , compute M ′ =
C∗5/Zi to respond, and adds (Y ||Y1||Y2||Y3||Y4, Zi) to list LH .
Note that M ′ is independent of d, and algorithm B’s response is similar to
the RKA decryption algorithm as required without using the secret key SK.
For other parts of this proof, as it follows that in Theorem 1, we do not
repeat them here. This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
Analysis. However, the above scheme is proved to be CC-RKA secure in the
random oracle which assumes that all parties have access to an ideal hash func-
tion and is extremely useful for designing simple, efficient and highly practical
solutions for many problems but from a theoretical view, a security proof in the
random oracle model is only heuristic indication of the system’s security. As a
result, from a perspective of security, a proof in the standard model is preferable
[14] to a proof in the random oracle model which does not assume idealized
oracle access and proves security with only standard complexity assumptions.
7 Conclusions
Wee [27] presented the first public-key encryption schemes against linear related-
key attacks under the standard assumptions in the standard model, and then
Bellare, Paterson and Thomson [6] provided a framework enabling RKA secure
cryptographic primitives for sets of related-key derivation functions that are non-
linear, but the instantiations achieving the full RKA security given in both of
them are in the context of regarding the (single-element or multi-element) private
key as a whole where each part of the private key shares the same modification.
Motivated by this, we focused on the construction of a fully CC-RKA secure
public-key encryption scheme in the setting where the private key is made up
of multiple components. Following the work in [27], in this paper, we made use
of a tag-based notion of CCA security [20] to achieve the CC-RKA security,
where the tag is derived using a strong one-time signature scheme. In this way,
as well as the gadget of randomness, we reduced the CC-RKA security of the
scheme to its CCA security with an addition property that any query (φ, C∗),
where φ is a related-key deriving function, and C∗ is a challenge ciphertext,
to RKA.Decrypt oracle, gives no information about the plaintext M∗ of C∗ to
the adversary. Specifically, we obtained a public-key encryption scheme with
multi-element private key secure against linear related-key attacks from bilinear
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pairings, based on an efficient selective-identity secure identity-based encryption
scheme without random oracles in [9], and proved its CC-RKA security under
the decisional BDH assumption. We discussed the CC-RKA security beyond
linear barrier where related-key deriving function could be non-linear such as
affine, polynomial in the random oracle model.
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